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During the first year of the current economic
recovery (1975.1-1976.1), the nation's gross
national product, in nominal terms, increased
by 13 percent. This rapid rate of economic ex-
pansion occurred along with relative ease in
financial markets; interest rates were lower in
the first quarter of 1976 than when the expan-
sion began in 1975. Surprisingly, however, the
growth in the economy and the decline in inter-
est rates have beenaccomplished with a relative-
ly moderate rate of growth in the money supply.
The actual M , rate of growth was 5.1 percent
from 1975.1 to 1976.J1-about half the rate
which standard money demand models estimate
as necessary to support the observed income
growth and decline in interest rates. This over-
prediction of money demand constitutes an un-
usually large forecast error, since standard
money demand functions (which relate the pub-
lic's demand for money balances to the level of
GNP and interest rates) generally have per-
formed well in estimating the growth in money."
However, beginning with the third quarter of
1974, these equations began overestimating the
public's demand for money by relatively large
and increasing amounts.
The demand for money is an important com-
ponent in the final relationship between money
and GNP. Changes in money have had fairly
predictable, although not exact, effects over
time on the gross national product.3 Because
of this relationship, the money stock has be-
come a significant variable in economic anal-
ysis. The central bank, in turn, has a degree
of control over the stock of money, making it
an important Federal Reserve policy variable.
"Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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The recent large forecast errors in the estimated
demand for money suggest a deterioration in
the ability ofpolicymakers to predict the impact
of changes in money upon economic activity.
This in turn suggests that less emphasis should
be placed upon the money supply as a guide in
the conduct of monetary policy. This paper
attempts to determine how much M, has de-
teriorated as an indicator ofmovements in GNP
since the recent appearance of large errors in
money demand.
Utilizing a version of the MPS model (Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology-University of
Pennsylvania-Social Science Research Coun-
cil),4 we conclude that there has been no ma-
terial deterioration in the overall relationship
between money and GNP since mid-1974, rela-
tive to what would be expected from past ex-
perience. The money supply (M,) remains as
useful an indicator of overall economic activity
as it has been in the past.
In the next section, we indicate the forecast
errors in the money demand equation included
in the MPS model and, using the familiar LM-
IS diagram, illustrate the policy question raised
by the recent shifts (Le., forecast errors) in
estimated money demand functions. Following
that, we analyze GNP forecast errors generated
by the MPS model and attempt to interpret re-
cent velocity movements.
Forecast errors in money demand
Since 1974.3, money demand equations have
shown large forecast errors, with forecasted
money holdings by the private sector exceeding
actual money (M,) balances. A conventional
relation which illustrates the nature of these_4.0 L...L-'-J--'----'~.L--"-____'__l.......l~L--'--L...L_'_.L__L_._.L.._'___.1~.L.L__'.......J
formation is available only through 1975.4.
Consequently, we cannot extendthe MPS model
estimates beyond the end of last year-but we
are able to estimate a standard-type money de-
mand equation using newly revised NIPA data.
This differs from the MPS model specification
in Appendix A in only a minor way: the dis-
count rate is deleted and the commercial-bank
passbook rate is used instead of the weighted
time-and-savings deposit rate. These minor
changes do not alter the error pattern shown
above.
The demand deposit equation estimated with
the revised NIPA data displays the same prob-
lematic errors as the MPS equation, with errors
increasing after 1974.3 and sharply accelerating
in the last half of 1975. However, the magni-
tude of the errors then appears to stabilize, at
TABLE 1
Forecast Error as
Forecast Error Percent of

















1974.1 -0.6 - .3

















Forecast error as percent of actual'
1970







These estimates and the MPS model equa-
tions are based upon National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) data for which in-
M PS Model Demand Deposit Equation
Chart 1A
Percent
errors is included in theMPS model. This model
uses two equations to forecast money (Mi ) de-
mand-one for the demand for currency and
one for the demand for demand deposits. The
currency equation has performed well since
mid-l974; the errors are relatively small and
within the range of past experience for this
equation. The demand deposit equation, on the
other hand, has overestimated the public's de-
mand for demand deposits and by relatively
large amounts. This equation (Appendix A) is
the major source of error in the prediction of
Mi'
In four of the six quarters from 1974.3 to
1975.4, the error in the demand deposit equa-
tion was outside the range of past experience
(Chart 1A and B, Table 1).' The largest error
prior to mid-1974 was $4.7 billion in 1972.2.
By 1974.4, however, demand deposits were
over-estimated by $6.7 billion and the error
reached $19.9 billion in 1975.4.
240about $20 billion in each quarter from 1975.4
to 1976.2.
These relatively large forecast errors have led
to·questions regarding the stability of the pub-
lic's demand for money-and even moreim-
portantly,to questions regarding the stability in
the relationship between money and income.
Specifically, do forecast errors in the demand
for money indicate a change from pastexperi-
ence in the relationship between changes in
money and changes in income? The question
canbe illustrated in terms of the familiar LM-IS
diagram.
Large econometric models, such as the MPS
model, can be thought of in terms of their two
major economic markets-that for goods-and-
services and that for money.6 The IS function
represents the equilibrium condition in the
goods-and-services market. It provides the
combination of all income levels and interest
rates for which intended saving plus taxes are
equal to investment plus government expendi-
tures. The LM function represents the equilib-
rium condition in the money market. On the
assumption of a given stock of money, it pro-
vides the combination of all income levels and
interest rates for which the demand for money
is equal to this supply. The equilibrium condi-
tion in the two markets is stated as a function
of two variables-the rate of interest and the
level ofincome.
InDiagram 1, the intersection of the LM and
IS curves represents a solution of the model
which provides the forecasted value ofGNP, Yo'
H the public wishes to hold smaller money bal-
ances at each level of income, the demand for
money and the corresponding LM curve will
Diagram 1
shift downward (LM,). The observed value of
GNPwill be Y, (the intersection of IS andLM1 )
rather than the forecasted value, Yo'
H the public's demand for money and the LM
curve continually shift downward bysubstantial
magnitudes, the model (which provides a fore-
cast based upon IS and the "old" LM function)
\vill underestimate G}~P by increasing amounts'.
It is in this sense that instability (i.e., shifts) in
the money demand equation will lead to insta~
bility in the overall relationship between money
and GNP. The uncertainty surrounding the de-
gree and cause of shifts in the public's demand
for money translates into uncertainty about the
impact which monetary changes will have upon
aggregate economic activity.
However, it is unrealistic to assume that
everything else remains unchanged when LM
fluctuates. The demand functions for goods
and services, such as inventory investment and
consumption, are notexact; in terms ofDiagram
1, we expect shifts in the IS function also. A
degree of uncertainty surrounds economic rela-
tions in both markets, so that a forecast gen-
erally is associated with a probable error range.
This range can be represented in an LM-IS
framework. In Diagram 2, LM1 and LM2 repre-
sent the range of values within which actual
future values may be observed in this money
market; IS, and ISz incorporate the range for
the goods-and-services market values. As be-
fore, the forecast value for GNP is represented
as the solution of the model, Yo' Y 1 and Y z
represent the range within which the actual
value may occur because the model's estimate
may be in error. When we take into considera-
tion the uncertainty surrounding future events,
Diagram 2





Incomethe actual value of GNP could occur anywhere
within the range Y,-Y2'
Diagram 2 illustrates that the forecast error
in one equation-for example, the demand for
money-may not throw the estimate of GNP
outside the expected range when changes occur
elsewhere, even when the forecast errors are
very large. In other words, the overall net im-
pact of unpredictable shifts in both the LM and
IS sectors are important in the final determina-
tion of GNP. Despite the uncertainty surround-
ing the public's demand for money balances, we
can determine empirically whether the overall
relationship between money and GNP has
changed from what past experience would lead
us to expect.
Forecast errors in MPS model
The MPS model was designed to capture the
channels through which monetary policy affects
aggregate economic activity, as is described in
a recent article by Albert Ando.a The forecast
errors generated by the model should reveal any
change in the ability of money to track GNP
since large errors first occurred in money de-
mand equations. The model was used to gen-
erate ex-postforecasts of GNP one to four quar-
TABLE 2
Nominal GNP Forecast Errors':'
MPS Quarterly Model
No Correction for Serial Correlation
(in billionsof dollars)
Quarters Beyond Initial Conditions**



































































* Forecast error = Forecasted minus Actual.
**Quarters beyond initial conditions refers to the number of quarters after the initial conditions quarter on which the
forecast was based. The first initial conditions quarter is 1969.4.
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First, after the 1971 change in the interna-
tional payments system, the model's import
equations began to generate very large under-
estimates of imports. Second, the introduction
of revenue sharing (which the model's state-
and-local -government expenditure equations
could only treat as categorical grants) caused
overestimates of state-and=local government ex-
penditures. Third, major errors occurred be-
cause of the failure of the model's price equa-
tions to pass through price increases generated
outside the domestic economy-such as those
occurringin the wake ofthe dollar devaluations,
OPEC oil price increases, and world crop short-
ages.
We adjusted for these factors by adding the
residuals from the estimated behavioral equa-
tions into the model equations, using some
judgment in adjusting for price increases. The
adjusted equations for these variables then fore-
cast historical values exactly when all the "right-
hand" variables were known. In our dynamic
simulations, errors in the adjusted equations re-
sult only from misestimates by other equations
as they feed into the "corrected" equations.




ters ahead from 1970.1 to 1975.3, the last
quarter for which we have a consistent data
bank.7 Results of these simulations are pre-
sented in Table 2.
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These ex-post forecasts differ from the usual
type_ of ex-ante forecasts in several important
respects. First, all values of the exogenous var-
iables are known and are set equal·to their his-
torical values. For the MPS model version we
are using, this means that the forecasts use ac-
tual values for the money supply and such var-
iables as federal government expenditures, tax
rates, farm inventories, population measures,
andexports.
Second, in our model simulations, we do not
utilize information available from knowledge of
previous behavioral equation errors. In an ac-
tual ex-ante forecast, the pattern of equation
errors is projected forward if the errors appear
systematic. Because this procedure is somewhat
arbitrary, we have not used it here, and in fact
have not used any information about past equa-
tion errors. All serial correlation terms have
been removed from the behavioral equations.
Third, we do not utilize the ex-ante forecast
procedure, whereby knowledge of special fac-
tors not included in the model specification
would be used to adjust the appropriate equa-
tions. For example, a labor strike which is ex-
pected in the forecast period would lead to some
adjustment of the labormarket equations, which
of course are not structured to capture the im-
pact of such events. This type of information,
when used in an actual ex-ante forecast, can cut
the model's errors substantially.
We do not utilize such model adjustments
(with several exceptions noted below), because
they contain an eiement of arbitrariness. We
are interested in what the model's estimated
structure has to say about the changing ability
of money to predict total income in the recent
period of money-demand overestimation. It is
not our concern here to minimize model errors,
but to observe and compare their size and pat-
tern overtime. Nevertheless, we have made sev-
eral exceptions to take account of certain eco-
nomic events which have directly affected the
model's basic structure.
38and state-and-Iocal government sectors is not
allowed to bias the full model simulation results.
The forecast error for one-quarter out (col-
umn 1, Table 2) is shown in Graph 2B as a
percentage of actual GNP. When shown in this
form, the forecast errors remain within the range
of the model's past experience throughout the
period of large money-demand overforecasts.
After declining from 1974.3 to 1975.2; the
error increased in 1975.3 to 3.1 percent of
GNP-understandably so, because quarters fol-
lowing a business-cycle trough are difficult peri-
ods to predict. Generally, however, these per-
centage errors do not reflect any marked deteri-
oration in the money-income relation as struc-
tured in the MPS model after mid-1974. From
1974.3 to 1975.2, both the dollar level and the
GNP percentage level of forecast errors are
within the range ofpast observations (column 1,
Table 2). It is interesting to note that the large
$47.4-billion underforecast of GNP in 1975.3
occurred in the same quarter as the largest error
in the demand-deposit estimate. But as noted
above, this error is within the range of past
model behavior when considered as a percent-
age of actual GNP.
It may be argued that changes in money have
an impact upon GNP only after some delay, so
that changes in money demand behavior should
have little influence on aggregate demand until
several quarters have passed. Thus, errors in
the money demand equation may not show up
immediately in the GNP forecasting model.
Many studies indicate that between 25 and 40
percent of the response in nominal GNP to a
change in money will occurwithin four quarters
of a monetary change,9 so we could expect a
significant forecast error in GNP to appear
about 4 quarters after the initial date (1974.3)
of the large money demand errors. In other
words, we should look at least three and four
quarters ahead, in order to allow more time for
a given change in money demand to influence
GNP.
Only a limited number of such forecasts are
available after 1974.3. The third quarter-out
forecast errors for the first three quarters of
1975 are $17.2 billion, $22.7 billion and -$18.4
39
billion respectively. The four quarter-out fore-
cast errors for 1975.2 and 1975.3 are $40.6
billion and -$5.6 billion. These forecast errors,
with one exception, are within the range of
error which the model has displayed since 1970.
The size and pattern of these errors suggest no
deterioration in the overall money-income rela-
tionship as structured in the MPS model. The
one exception is the $40.6-billion overforecast
of 1975.2, which results from the model's failure
to capture the depth of the recent trough ap-
proximately one year before it occurred. How-
ever, this does not indicate a continuing fore-
casting failure, since the model was otherwise
able to forecast within the range of past experi-
ence for all other forecast quarters since mid-
1974.
We should emphasize that many of the errors
in third and fourth quarter-out forecasts have
the opposite sign from what the typical money
demand-GNP model would suggest. Normally
we would expect a decline in the demand for
money to lead the model to underforecast GNP,
and not the reverse. This point was demon-
strated above in LM-IS Diagram 1. While the
errors we have observed generally are within
the expected historic range, the signs of many of
the forecast errors are not consistent with the
assumption that a downward shift in the money
demand has dominated the money-income rela-
tionship.
In brief, no matter how uncertain money de-
mand estimates have been since 1974.3, the
money-income relation-as structured in the
MPS model-does not appear to have gone off
track because of shifts in money demand. In
the one quarter in which the error was outside
past experience, we observed a $40.6 billion
overforecast of GNP. But we would have ex-
pected a negative forecast error, an underfore-
cast of GNP, if downward shifts in money de-
mand had dominated the money-income rela-
tionship.
Alook at M1 velocity
A key question is what has happened to the
money-GNP relationship since 1975.3. The MJ
velocity series, the ratio of nominal GNP to theannual rate cOIilpared with a3-percent trend
rate). Thus, velocity was close to its long-run
trend value by late 1975, and it has remained
closeto trend during the first half of 1976.
Despite.the large shifts in· velocity since
1974.3, the deviations from trend are within the
rangeofpastexperience andare actuallysmaller
than in·Some earlier·periods, such as ·1966-67.
This suggests that a model relating movements
in moneyto GNP should continue tobesuccess-
ful in its trackingabiIities, as has been demon-
stratedbya small modeldeveloped at the>Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
l1 The
model's basic output equation relates·move-
ments in real money balances to real GNP. Its
forecasting errors through 1975.4 indicate an
ability to track GNP within an error range con-
sistent with the equation's past performance.
In brief, the M 1 velocity series is not display-
ing atypical behavior. This suggests that the
money-income relationship has remained stable
after 1974.3, when increasingly large errors be-
gan to appear in money demand equations.
Ratio
money stock, provides some information re-
gardingthis matter. Current erraticmovements
in the velocity series could signal instability in
the •complicated economic process by which
changes in money are related to current eco-
. nOIllicactivity. InMichael Keran's words, "If
we are entering a period of unpredictable move-
mentsinmoney turnover, it means increasingly
unstable relationships between money and in-
come due possibly to an increased instability in
the demand for mol1ey."lO But after looking at
deviations from trendinthevelocitydata, Keran
concluded that "velocity may not be too far out
of line given the present stage of the business
cycle...."
The data in Chart 3 portray the typical cycli-
cal pattern in M 1 velocity-growing below the
trend rate inthe downswing of a cycle and above
it in the upswing. Recent velocity behavior fol-
lows that pattern. The past recession was par-
ticularly severe-the steepest decline since the
late 1930's-and this was followed by the
sharpest recovery ofpost-World War IIhistory,
with a 13-percent gain in nominal GNP from
1975.2 to 1976.2. Velocity mirrored these Summary and conclusions
sharp GNP movements, growing slowly relative Since mid-1974, economists have been be-
to trend during the recession and quite rapidly wiIdered by the large overforecasts of money
in the last half of 1975 (at about a 10-percent growth which their standard money demand re-
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40lationships have produced. Forecast money
growth was abouttwice as great as actual money
growth for the first year of the current recovery.
These large forecasting errors haveled to ques-
tions regarding the ability of standard models
ofthe U.S. economy to forecast GNP..Econo-
metricmodels ofthe U.S. economylinkchanges
in a monetary aggregate to changes in overall
economic activity. The demand for money is
animportant element in the transmission mech-
anism by which changes in money lead to
changes in income.
In this paper we have focused upon an em-
pirical study of the GNP forecast errors in one
large quarterly econometric model. The forecast
errors in GNP since mid-1974-the start of the
large errors in money demand-were generally
inside the range of forecast errors made by the
model in the past. But since MPS data extend
only through 1975.3, we have utilized the M]
velocity series to gain some indication of the
more recent money-income relationship. The
data suggest that the current relation between
money and income has remained similar to its
past expected behavior. The relationship, while
not exact, has remained consistent, and thus did
not fall apart during the time of unpredictable
shifts inmoney demand.
Our study suggests two possible interpreta-
tions of this finding. First, the MPS model re-
sults demonstrate that the money-income rela-
tionship may remain on track as a result of the
net impact of errors in both the IS and LM sec-
tors. Although errors in the money demand
equation (and corresponding LM function)
were larger thanexpected in late 1974, the GNP
forecast errors demonstrate that the uncertainty
in the goods-and-services sector for several
quarters dominated the actual deviation of out-
put from its expected value. The largest GNP
errors in the latter forecast quarters were over-
estimates of GNP-rather than underestimates,
which would have been consistent with the
errors in money demand.
Whetherornot money fails to trackGNP will
depend upon the behavior of all economic mar-
kets. This has an important policy implication.
One factor in the choice of a monetary policy
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instrument is the relative stability of the mone-
tary sector compared· with that of the goods-
and-services sector. When there is greater un-
certainty •(i.e., unpredictaNe shifts) in the
monetary than in the goods-and-services sector,
there maybeless variation in final output with
an interest-rate policy instrument than with a
monetary aggregate. Accordingly, the unpre-
dictable shifts inmoneydemand since mid-1974
led some observers to advocate an interest rate
policy. This policy, however, is not appropriate
when the major source of unpredictability in
GNP stems from changes in investment be-
havior, consumption expenditures or any of the
other components of GNP. The MPS simula-
tions suggest that the unpredictable nature of
the real sector may have been the major source
of unpredictable movements in GNP for some
time after mid"1974, and that a monetaryaggre-
gate policy was appropriate although the money
demand equation exhibited large overforecasts
of money demand at that time.
This interpretation thus emphasizes the net
impact of sector errors, and assumes that the
estimated money demand function is an accu-
rate representation of the public'S behavior.
However, there is an alternative explanation
for the stability of the money-income relation-
ship-namely, that the public's demand for
money has not· changed. The velocity series
appear consistent with this alternative interpre-
tation. The observed errors may be the fault of
a misspecification of the equation used to pre-
dict the public's actual demand for money. The
estimated money demand function simply failed
to capture the money demand relationship accu-
rately, and the errors became pronounced be-
ginning in 1974.3. Similar situations have oc-
curred .before, with large errors occurring in
estimated money demand equations.12 In pre-
vious instances, many analysts argued that fore-
cast errors were the result of an inadequate spe-
cification ofthe demand for money. Theirefforts
led to the development of improved equations
which provided a more accurate measurement
ofthe public's behavior.
Recent work byEnzler, Johnson and Paulus13
may be interpreted along these lines. Theseauthors contend that while the post mid-1974
en:orsin the money demand function are still
relatively large, they can be substantially re-
duc~dfromthose shownin Table 1by respecify-
ing the.income variable and the interest rate in
tb,eMPSequation. They also note thatrecent
errors may be reduced by $4.5-5.0 billion, by
adjusting demand deposit data to exclude for-
eign bank and official deposits and to include
NOW accounts (Negotiable Orders of With-
drawal). Foreign balances are generally held
for purposes.unrelated to domestic economic
activity; NOW accounts, which are still quite
smallbut growing, are interest bearing accounts
at commercial banks and thrift institutions on
which checks can be drawn.
Work along these lines appears most prom-
ising and deserving of further research. Keran,10
for example, is critical of the typical use of the
Treasury bill rate as the appropriate measure of
the.opportunity cost of holding money. He sug-
gests that alternative measures be sought to cap-
ture the substantial rise in risk which accom-
panied the recent era of unprecedented inflation
and recession. In addition, there are many in-
stitutionalfactors and technological innovations
which may reduce the (actual or potential) de-
mand for transaction balances. Several of these
factors, such as changes in compensating bal-
ance requirements or in the corporate manage-
ment of cash balances, have been analyzed by
Ruth Wilson.14
As the research into money demand con-
tinues,wemay find that institutional factors and
teGhnological innovations will cause significant
changes in the relationship between money
(however defined) and total economic activity
(as.measur~d .by. GNP). However, theevi-
d~ncepresentedinthispapersuggests that much
oUherecent uncertainty in money demand can
bereduced and that since mid-1974 the ability
ofMlto track movements in GNP has not de-
teriorated relative to past expected behavior.
The Federal Reserve has found M1 to be a
usefulpolicyvariable, although the achievement
ofa.particularpreconceived money stock is not
the objective of monetary policy. Federal Re-
serve Chairman Arthur Burns, referring to tar-
geted growth rates for monetary aggregates, has
statedbefore Congress,
We at the Federal Reserve have viewed these
growth ranges as useful guides for the conduct
of monetary policy. However, the objective
of monetary policy is not to achieve any pre-
conceived growth rates of monetary or credit
aggregates, but to facilitate expansion of
economic activity and to foster stability in the
generalprice levelY
The recent errors in forecasting the public's
demand .for money have raised questions as to
whether the money supply can still serve as a
useful guide to monetary policy. The results
presented in this paper suggest that it can do so.
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The demand for Demand Deposits by the DD is the commercial bank demand de-
nonbankpublic is representedin the MPS model posits measured as the two - month
bya standard type of money demand function average surrounding the end of the
which is consistent with the Baumol transaction quarter.
demand model.* GNP$ is Gross National Product (GNP) in
In DD _ .519 + .280 In DD_ 1 .062 In RTB currentdollars.
GN~ GN~ GNP isGNPin 1958 dollars.
(-4.1) (1.6) (-5.1) RTB represents the 90-day Treasury Bill
Rate.
RS is an average offering rate paid on time
and savings deposits at commercial
banks and thrift institutions.
42RDISC is the FederalReserve Discount Rate.
GNP is the U.S. population.
N is the highest percapita GNP achieved
in the current or any preceding 19
quarters.
Sample period: 1955.3 - 1972.4.
An iterated instrumental variable estimation
technique was used to estimate the equation to-
gether with the bank free reserves equation. The
estimation included GNP per capita; this term
was replaced by the maximum GNP per capita
value early in 1974 although the equation was
not re-estimated. The values in parenthesis are
T-statistics. Forfurther discussion of this equa-
tion as well as the currencyequation, see Franco
Modigliani, Richard Cooper and Robert
Rasche, Central Bank Policy, Interest Rates,
and the Money Supply, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, Vol. 2, 1970: 166-218.
"See W. J. Baumol, "The Transactions Demand for Cash;
An Inventory Theoretic Approach, Quarterly Journal 0/
Economics, November 1952.
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is equal to currency in the hands of the public and demand
deposits ofcommercial banks.
2. for a comprehensive review of conventional money de-
mand equations see Stephen Goldfeld, "The Demand for
Money Revisited." Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
3 (1973): 577-638.
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ess which contains a comprehensive bibliography see Roger
W. Spencer, "Channels of Monetary Influence: A Survey,"
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4. A listing of the MPS econometric model equations is
obtainable from EfA, University of Pennsylvania, Philadel-
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provided by Ando, see footnote 3.
5. The prediction errors in the MPS demand for demand
deposits equation were obtained by setting all the explana-
tory variables equal to actual values and setting the auto-
correlation coefficient equal to zero. The third quarter of
1975 is the last quarter for which we have consistent data
bank: revisions are being made in light of the recently
issued NIA data. Appendix A provides the money demand
equation used in the MPS model.
6. for a text which describes the LM-IS functions, see
Thomas f. Dernburg and Duncan M. McDougall, Macro-
Economics, McGraw-Hili Book Co., Inc., New York, 1960.
7. The Board of Governors Staff is re-estimating an en-
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NIPAdata.
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GNP was overforecasted by $1.8 billion. The second-quar-
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conditions of 1969.4) is an underforecast of $8.2 billion.
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1975.3 is an underestimate of $47.4 billion.
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